


The Racial Discourses of Life Philosophy Négritude, Vitalism, and Modernity



*the committee for the study of
desert alchemy*

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Originally published by Columbia University Press, 2010

Pirated by the Committee for the Study of Desert Alchemy, a functionary
of the Vitalist International, 2019

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Acknowledgments

As a student in the department of comparative literature, I began with an interest in modernist aesthetics and Frankfurt School critical theory but soon found myself deeply immersed in Middle High German and Latin. However, the great Maryse Condé made irresistible the study of Caribbean literature, and I was lucky to have had two other wonderful teachers: the late VêVê Clark and Julio Ramos, who encouraged me to turn my theoretical and linguistic training on postcolonial literature. At the same time, I attended Martin Jay's seminar on the philosophy of history and found myself filling up notebooks with his careful introductions to the major texts. As I was finishing coursework, I then had the greatest fortune of Judith Butler coming to Berkeley and taking me on as a graduate student. She allowed me to understand what rigorous theoretical argument really is, and in advising me, she showed me what intellectual commitment can be. She somehow found the time to read the Caribbean literature on which I was working simply to advise me; my debt to her critical reading of Deleuze is manifest.

I have had the great fortune of having taught at two great institutions—Princeton and Stanford. At both universities I had the support of invaluable colleagues. I am appreciative of Arnold Rampersad, an inspiration and great colleague at both institutions. At Princeton, Claudia Tate was my mentor and my friend, and I miss her dearly. I would be remiss not to recall the heady engagement of my senior colleagues Michael Wood, Eduardo Cadava, and Jonathan Lamb. I am also thankful to my dear friends and present colleagues Saydiya Hartman and Stephen Best for having chosen me to participate in a seminar on the theory of redress at the Institute for the Humanities at UC Irvine.

The sharpest comments I received on the present manuscript were delivered to me in conversations with Catherine Gallagher. They have led to much rethinking and revision, though of course she is not responsible for what the book has become. It meant the world to me that someone would be interested enough in the manuscript to articulate its contradictions and locate its potential. Charles Altieri read the whole manuscript and made many invaluable suggestions. Snehal Sanghvi also provided many helpful comments. My colleague Colleen Lye has been the closest of friends for almost a decade now—we read each other's dissertations, and on topics ranging from Frank Norris to racial mythology her thinking has shaped and directed mine. I would like to thank my department for the generous leave time I was granted, which allowed for the completion of this work and for a rigorous review of my work.

I am proud indeed to appear in the series that Amy Allen has edited, and her comments on this manuscript were insightful and helpful. I am very thankful to Wendy Lochner, who handled my manuscript expeditiously and found two excellent reviewers. Rob Fellman did an excellent job copyediting the text.

At Berkeley, I have been the lucky recipient of generous support from the Hellman Family Fund; without this help, my research budget would have been constrained. My mother has been with me every step of the way. My parents-in-law have provided important financial support and, more importantly, a wonderful extended family. My husband Rakesh Bhandari has been with this project since its inception and before; his interlocution has been invaluable. The book is dedicated to our two daughters, Avinashi and Aarushi: Avinashi's birth marked the conception of this book on life, and I finished it a few days before Aarushi's arrival. Children do remind us that our most astounding, involving, and vital experiences are those in which we have minimal experience of self-consciousness.

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Notes

Introduction. The Resilience of Life

1. Ed Regis, *What Is Life? Investigating the Nature of Life in the Age of Synthetic Biology* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008).
2. Nikolas Rose, *The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).
3. Maurice Bloch, *Essays in Cultural Transmission* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2005); Luis Villarreal, “Are Viruses Alive?” *Scientific American* (November 2004), <http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=00077043-911C-119B-8EA483414B7FFE9F&cclid=1>.
4. Matthew Cobb, *Generation: The Seventeenth-Century Scientists Who Unraveled the Secrets of Sex, Life, and Growth* (New York: Bloomsbury Books, 2006).
5. Regis, *What Is Life?* 64.
6. Regis, *What Is Life?* 58.
7. John Maynard Smith and Eors Szathmáry, *The Origins of Life: From the Birth of Life to the Origin of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
8. Albert Jacquard “Human Rights and Human Nature,” <http://www.unesco.org/opiz/human-rights/Pages/English/JacquardE.html>. Jacquard, however, reaches radically humanist conclusions. Underlining that the human metamorphosis into a self-conscious social person is not genetically programmed but the result of education, he argues for a special category of rights for human beings to ensure this fragile process of metamorphosis.
9. Rudolf A. Makkereel, “The Feeling of Life: Some Kantian Sources of Life-Philosophy,” in *Dilthey Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, bd. 3 (1985), 86–87, 101–102. A descendent of this argument is George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's thesis that our basic categories are metaphors (for example, inside/outside or up/down) rooted in lived bodily experience. See their *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
10. See Michel Foucault in *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, trans. A. M. Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1973), 144; Leonard Lawlor, *The Implications of Immanence* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 139.
11. The effects of violent death on the formation of black subjectivity are analyzed in Abdul JanMohamed, *The Death-Bound Subject: Richard Wright's Archaeology of Death* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005). For Wright,

the constant threat of physical violence and death in the age of lynching did not produce an indifference to worldly fate and thus resignation to extant social forms but rather a powerful, politically engaged form of existentialism. JanMohamed also draws on Orlando Patterson, who described slavery as a kind of living death or a social death resulting from natal alienation. There have been two kinds of death at the heart of the American black experience, and JanMohamed connects them in this stunning way, see 18ff. in particular. See also Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).

12. François Jacob, *The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity*, trans. B.E. Spillmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 19–20.

13. M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in the Romantic Tradition* (New York: Norton, 1971), 431–432; see also his *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953). Of course, Abrams's identification of the Romantics with life and his aesthetic idealization of the organic form has been challenged. See, for example, Dominick LaCapra, *Soundings in Critical Theory* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 90–133.

14. Mark Antliff, *Avant-Garde Fascism: The Mobilization of Myth, Art, and Culture in France, 1909–1939* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007).

15. Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of Beginning Under Mussolini and Hitler* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 317.

16. Luc Boltanski, “The Left After May 1968 and the Longing for Total Revolution,” *Thesis Eleven* 69 (May 2002): 1–20.

17. Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany, 1831–1933*, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 139.

18. Alain Badiou, *The Century*, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Polity Press, 2007), 13–14.

19. Michael Dash, *The Other America: Caribbean Literature in a New World Context* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998), 61–62.

20. Hilary Fink, *Bergson and Russian Modernism, 1900–1930* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999).

21. Ernst Bloch, *Heritage of Our Times*, trans. Neville Plaice and Stephen Plaice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 319–320. In his richly allusive prose style, Bloch seems to argue that in his last book, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Bergson distanced himself from his entrepreneurial vitalism and acknowledged in a mystified way the need for rational social organization. But this reads Bloch's own wishes into Bergson's final work.

22. Quoted in R. C. Grogan, *The Bergsonian Controversy in France* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1988), 199.

23. Heinrich Heine, “Differing Conceptions of History,” quoted in Stathis Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx*, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso Press, 2003), 66–67.

24. Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution*, 67.

25. See Londa Schiebinger, *Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). Schiebinger argues that mercantilists who found the key to the wealth of nations in the size of

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- the labor force blocked the importation of abortifacients discovered by rebellious slave women.
26. Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 145.
27. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1987), 285.
28. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Séan Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 92–93; quoted in John S. Ransom, “Forget Vitalism: Foucault and *Lebensphilosophie*,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 23, no. 33 (1997): 34–47. Ransom has provocatively challenged the claim that Foucault was a vitalist. He argues that his defenders, such as Deleuze, wrongly suggest that vitalism provides him with a normative foundation to critique institutions and disciplines and that his critics insist on his vitalism to charge him with irrationalism and the lack of a tenable normative theory. Ransom then points to Foucault's discussion of Georges Canguilhem and shows that Foucault disavows in a couple of passages vitalist critiques of the putative deadening effects of the philosophy of the concept and of extant configurations of power. This is a provocative argument, and I shall express similar skepticism about vitalism. But Ransom's argument is premised on the assumption that Foucault was aware of all the ways in which vitalism affected his thought and that he did not take or imply contradictory stances toward vitalism. Ransom also argues that Judith Butler's normative theory is predicated on Foucault's vitalism and based on the value of life's ever greater plenitude against any rigid system. I shall argue in the last chapter that this claim simply ignores the Hegelian elements in Butler's thought.
29. Enrique Dussel, “From Critical Theory to the Philosophy of Liberation: Some Themes for Dialogue,” trans. George Ciccariello Maher (unpublished, 2004), 2–3, 9. Paper in the author's possession.
30. Dussel, “From Critical Theory to the Philosophy of Liberation,” 19.
31. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).
32. Paul Rabinow, “French Enlightenment: Truth and Life,” *Economy and Society* 27, no. 2/3 (1998): 194–200.
33. Aimé Césaire, *Notebook of a Return to the Native Land*, trans. and ed. Clayton Eshleman and Annette Smith (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press), 11–12. See Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
34. Roberto Esposito, *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 98, 128. Esposito offers the radical thesis that the metaphor of immunization is the *differentia specifica* of modern politics, but he dates the introduction of the paradigm to the early modern era while not showing that much was understood about biological immunization at that time or that the law about juridical immunity was well developed. Germ theory was, of course, introduced centuries later. Also to the extent that many contradictory things can be done in the name of the life of a people, the immunitary paradigm is necessarily underdetermined as to what a state actually does.
35. Rose, *The Politics of Life Itself*, 58.

36. Elizabeth Grosz, *The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press), 260.
37. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 146. I thank Alberto Toscano for discussion of relevant passages.
38. Rosi Braidotti, *Transpositions* (London: Polity Press, 2006), 129–130. But Braidotti herself actually has the title of “Knight in the Order of the Nederlandse Leeuw.”
39. A murderous bio-logic haunts us today with the objectification of immigrant workers as illegal aliens parasitical on the state and economy. Imagined as carriers of viruses, they are seen as a viral threat that must be fenced out and violently extirpated.
40. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, “Thoughts on the Concept of Biopower Today,” http://www.molsci.org/research/publications_pdf/Rose_Rabinow_Biopower_Today.pdf.
41. Adorno as quoted in Alastair Morgan, “Petrified Life: Agamben, Adorno, and the Possibility of Life.” The quotation comes from a prepublication version to which I am indebted to Professor Morgan for access.
42. Quoted in Eric Santner, *On the Psychopathology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 22.
43. Of course, bodies that have lost that capability could still be enlivened by amplifying the electrical current, exactly what Dr. Frankenstein had to do in an act of assisted conception. Here Mary Shelley was drawing on and publicizing well-known experiments in which electricity was used to cause lifelike muscular contractions in corpses; in one experiment, electrical shocks to the chest resulted in a corpse blowing out a lighted candle. Electricity thus appeared as the vital principle, the spark of life. See David Channel, *The Vital Machine: A Study of Technology and Organic Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 56.
44. Frederick C. Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781–1801* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 541.
45. F. Abiola Irele, *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology* (London: Heinemann, 1981).
46. George Rousseau, “Traditions of Enlightenment Vitalism,” in *The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy*, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 50.
47. Leon Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe* (London: Heinemann, 1974), 5.
48. Achille Mbembe, “Nicolas Sarkozy’s Africa,” <http://www.africaresource.com/content/view/376/68>. See an earlier, similar criticism: René Ménéil, *Tracées: Identité, Négritude, esthétique aux Antilles* (Paris: R. Laffont, 1981).
49. Raymond Plant, *Hegel: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 236.
50. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 158.
51. Thanks to Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria for this reference.
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1. On the Mechanical, Machinic, and Mechanistic
- Jacques Louis Hymans, “French Influences on Leopold Senghor’s Theory of *Négritude*, 1928–1948,” *Race and Class* 7 (1966): 367; *see also* Jacques Louis Hymans, *Leopold Sédar Senghor: An Intellectual Biography* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971).
 - Quoted in Rudiger Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, trans. Ewald Osers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 54.
 - Senghor, “Prayer to the Masks,” in Leopold Sédar Senghor, *The Collected Poetry*, trans. Melvin Dixon (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998), 14.
 - Safranski, *Martin Heidegger*, 54.
 - I have in mind here Daniel Pick, *War Machine: The Rationalization of Slaughter in the Modern Age* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993).
 - Georges Canguilhem, *Knowledge of Life*, ed. Paola Marrati and Todd Meyers, trans. Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsburg (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 73. While Canguilhem focuses on the response to mechanism within biology, my focus will be on the wider cultural meanings of antimechanism.
 - Tom Quirk, *Bergson and American Culture: The Worlds of Willa Cather and Wallace Stevens* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). This is a fine study of the spiritual needs Bergsonism met in a Godless world promised only entropy and heat death by science.
 - This is what Stephen Toumlin does for the sciences in “From Clocks to Chaos: Humanizing the Mechanistic World View,” in *The Machine as Metaphor and Tool*, ed. Herman Haken, Anders Karlqvist, and Uno Svedin (New York: Springer Verlag, 1993), 139–153.
 - Sanford Schwarz, “Bergson and the Politics of Vitalism,” in *The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy*, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 277–305.
 - Bergson, “Laughter,” in *Comedy*, ed. George Meredith (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 66–67.
 - Pheng Cheah, *Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of Liberation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 35.
 - E. J. Dijksterhuis, *The Mechanization of the World Picture: Pythagoras to Newton*, trans. C. Dikshoorn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 70, 43 iff.
 - René Descartes, *The World and Other Writings*, trans. Stephen Gaukroger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 100. *See also* Susan Bordo, *Feminist Interpretations of René Descartes* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); and Paolo Rossi, *The Birth of Modern Science*, trans. Cynthia De Nardi Ipsen (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).
 - See the appendix on the history of vitalism in* Guy Brown, *The Energy of Life: The Science of What Makes Our Minds and Bodies Work* (New York: The Free Press, 2000).

15. See Gaby Wood, *Edison's Eve: A Magical History of the Quest for Mechanical Life* (New York: Knopf, 2002). Her chapter "The Blood of the Android" has an excellent history of the mechanization of life.
16. Garland Allen argues that the defense of such explanatory or operational mechanisms does not depend on the ontological mechanism. He proposes that it is possible to commit to the former kind of mechanism while allowing for the unique and emergent properties of organisms. Garland Allen, "Mechanism, Vitalism, and Organicism in Late Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Biology: The Importance of Historical Context," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 36 (2005): 261–283.
17. See Hilda Hein, *The Origin and Nature of Life* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971).
18. David Channell, *Vital Machine: A Study of Technology and Organic Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 54.
19. See also Stephen Rose, *Lifelines: Biology Beyond Determinism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
20. Jane Maienschein, *Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 26.
21. Stuart Shanker, "Descartes' Legacy: The Mechanist/Vitalist Debates," in *The Philosophy of Science, Mathematics, and Logic in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Stuart Shanker (New York: Routledge, 1996), 316.
22. Quoted in Evelyn Fox Keller, *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender, and Science* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 67.
23. Keller, *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death*, 68.
24. Shanker, "Descartes' Legacy," 318–319.
25. The Great Chain of Being has at least two meanings. Shanker is focused on it as a continuum that links animal and human life; as we will see later, the Great Chain also implied the doctrine of plenitude, the idea that all the potential forms of life would be actualized in the course of evolution. Life is thus less a category of homeostasis or efficiency but maximalization and exuberance. The title of Bergson's major work, *Creative Evolution*, obviously suggests this meaning.
26. Nikolas Rose, *The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 21. Rose is summarizing an unpublished essay by Ian Hacking.
27. Carolyn Porter, "Reification and American Literature," in *Ideology and Classic American Literature*, ed. Sacvan Berkovitch and Myra Jehlen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 188–220.
28. J. W. Burrow, *The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848–1914* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 200), 35. Also, Georges Canguilhem has shown that while antivitalistic, the emergent chemistry of the nineteenth century initially "replaced the mechanical model of the organism proposed by Descartes with a model of antiquity: that of the flame. The organism had yet to be seen as a machine powered by heat, but it was no longer seen as one driven by weights (a clock), by springs (a watch), by air (an organ), or by a water (a mill)." Canguilhem as quoted by Bernard Doray, *From Taylorism to Fordism: A Rational Madness* (London: Free Association, 1988), 183.
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29. See Mark Seltzer, *Bodies and Machines* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 143–144.
30. Doray, *From Taylorism to Fordism*, 84.
31. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (London: Fontana, 1988).
32. Colleen Lye, *America's Asia: Racial Form and American Literature, 1893–1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 95.
33. See the interesting discussion of Henri de Man and Ortega y Gasset in Stanley Pierson, *Leaving Marxism: Studies in the Dissolution of an Ideology* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 71.
34. Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 12. Jonas's attempt to fashion a neovitalist philosophy led him to a politics of ecology and an eventual countenance of authoritarian politics as necessary to prevent ecological destruction. See Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). But one should of course be careful not to equate any regulation on businesses and personal life in the service of ecological sustainability with authoritarianism.
35. See Maurice Godelier, *Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology*, trans. Robert Brain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
36. See Susan Bordo, *The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). Bordo has also explored the connection between gender difference and Cartesian dualism. That reason is viewed as disembodied was taken to imply that those who could not free themselves of their bodies could not reason and act freely. Cartesian dualism became gender hierarchy. Yet this remains a controversial though provocative reading, indeed.
37. Cheah, *Spectral Nationality*, 32–33.
38. Cheah, *Spectral Nationality*, 47.
39. Cheah, *Spectral Nationality*, 94.
40. Cheah, *Spectral Nationality*, 59.
41. Canguilhem, *Knowledge of Life*, 72.
42. Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters* (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1954), 33–35. Schiller takes up the idea that, in the modern world, the growth of empirical knowledge, the division of labor, and the separation of ranks all mean that man has become specialized and divided, with the result that the “totality of the species” (*Totalität der Gattung*) becomes impossible to recover from its “fragments” (*Bruchstücke*), the individual members.
43. Michael Rosen, *On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 145. It can be noted in passing that Emile Durkheim later inverted Schiller's categories, in that the modern political economy, with its development of the division of labor, had created a universal interdependence resembling the organs of a living body, while primitive societies were understood as mechanical, in that parts being more or less mechanical copies of each other all could perform the same actions.

44. Cheah, *Spectral Nationality*, 29.
45. Rosen, *Voluntary Servitude*, 143.
46. Cheah, *Spectral Nationality*, 29.
47. Hymans, *Leopold Sédar Senghor*, 48–52.
48. Quoted in Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Négritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 248.
49. Pope Pius XI, “Quadragesimo Anno,” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html; Leopold Senghor, *On African Socialism* (New York: Praeger, 1964).
50. Max Horkheimer, “On Bergson’s Metaphysics of Time,” *Radical Philosophy* 113 (May–June 2005): 14–15.
51. Rosen, *Voluntary Servitude*, 154.
52. Marcien Towa, *Léopold Sédar Senghor: Négritude or Servitude?* (Yaoundé: Editions CLE, 1971).
53. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 499–503.
54. See Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Deleuze argues: “It’s organisms that die, not life. Any work of art points a way through for life, finds a way through the cracks. Everything I’ve written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is, and amounts to a theory of signs and events” (143).
55. Again, one should not conflate early Romantic organicism with totalitarianism.
56. Todd May, *Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 122–124.
57. Édouard Glissant, *Poetics of a Relation*, trans. Betsy Wing (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
58. Richard Lewontin has often challenged just this premise.
59. Robert J. Richards, *The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
60. Richards, *The Romantic Conception of Life*, 539.
61. D. H. Lawrence, *Women in Love* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1988), 327.
62. Elizabeth Grosz, *The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), 7–8.
63. In *Bergson and American Culture*, Tom Quirk has, as already noted, provided a penetrating study of the foreboding pessimism created by the assimilation of Darwinian naturalism.
64. The example is from John Maynard Smith, *The Problems of Biology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
65. Richard Lewontin, *It Ain’t Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome and Other Illusions* (New York: NYRB, 2001), 117.
66. Richards highlights this passage from *On the Origins of Species* in *The Romantic Conception of Life*, 83–84.
67. Paul Rabinow, “Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology and Biosociality,” in *Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and*
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- Life Politics*, ed. Jonathan Xavier Inda (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 181–193, esp. 191.
68. I quote from the last paragraph of Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).
69. Quoted in Ivan Strenski, *Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth-Century History: Cassirer, Eliade, Levi-Strauss, and Malinowski* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1987), 64.
70. Ernest Gellner, *Plow, Sword, and Book: The Structure of Human History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 142.
71. Bruce Trigger, *Sociocultural Evolution: Calculation and Contingency* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 60–61.
72. Gellner, *Plow, Sword, and Book*, 142.
73. Gellner, *Plow, Sword, and Book*, 142–144.
74. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Modern Library, 1911), 64–75.
75. So argues his foremost disciple, Jacques Chevalier, in *Henri Bergson* (New York: Macmillan Books, 1928).
76. Léopold Senghor, “The Spirit of Civilization, or the Laws of African Negro Culture,” *Présence Africaine* 8–10 (June–November 1956): 64. Emphasis added.
77. Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 251.
78. Georges Canguilhem, *A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings from Georges Canguilhem* (New York: Zone Books, 2000). Canguilhem writes that Man “can look at nature in two ways. He *feels* that he is a child of nature and has a sense of belong to something larger than himself; he sees himself in nature and nature in himself. But he also *stands before* nature as an indefinable alien object. A scientist who feels filial, sympathetic sentiments towards nature will not regard natural phenomena as strange and alien; rather he will find in them life, soul and meaning. Such a man is basically a vitalist” (288–289).
79. See Arthur Lovejoy, *Bergson and Romantic Evolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1914).
80. Defined by Hegel as variously without vivacity, vitality, or liveliness. See Michael Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
81. Bergson, *Comedy*, 29.
82. Bergson, *Comedy*, 25–27.
83. See F. C. T. Moore, *Bergson: Thinking Backwards* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 80.
84. Scott Lash and Celia Lury, *The Global Cultural Industry: Mediation of Things* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 184.
85. Bergson, *Comedy*, 117.
86. See Craig Brandist, *The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture, and Politics* (London: Pluto, 2002), 127.
87. René Ménil, “Humour: Introduction to 1945,” in *Refusal of the Shadow: Surrealism and the Caribbean*, ed. Michael Richardson, Krzysztof Fijakowski, and Philip Lamantia (London: Verso, 1996), 162–175.
88. Eric Santner, *On the Psychopathology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 23.

89. Bergson, *Comedy*, 86ff. This is not an isolated instance of Bergson's colonial racism. His comments about contemporary primitive societies reproduces the worst colonial stereotypes of stasis and savagery. See Henri Bergson, *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesly Brereton (New York: Doubleday, 1935), 136–137. Bergson also thought African “savages” incapable of mobilizing the past for the purposes of the present; their memory was putatively only spontaneous, as their intellectual development had not gone beyond that of children. See also Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 154. I don't know of critical comments on this aspect of Bergson's thought in the neo-Bergsonian literature.

90. Ménil, “Humor,” 173.

91. Aimé Césaire, *Notebook of a Return to the Native Land*, trans. Clayton Eshleman and Annette Smith (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), 4–5.

92. Leon Damas, “Hiccups [*Hoquet*],” in *Négritude: Black Poetry from Africa and the Caribbean*, ed. and trans. Norman Shapiro (October House: New York: 1970), 58.

93. Ménil, “Humour,” 163.

94. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 138–139.

95. Bourdieu's view of action is not quite mechanical, as he allows for some flexibility in action and strategy. But that freedom is quite circumscribed.

96. Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 163.

97. That only living or animate labor can add new value is a vitalist premise that we find in classical political economy. See Catherine Gallagher, *The Body Economic: Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

2. Contesting Vitalism

1. The passage quoted as this chapter's epigraph is from Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany, 1831–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 139.

2. I am even skeptical of—though genuinely moved by—Axel Honneth's important confrontation with the intellectual exhaustion of vitalism and Marxism and of his attempt to find new grounds for critical theory in the struggle for recognition, as will become clear in my discussion of Césaire in the last chapter. For what other than genuine recognition was Ralph Ellison's invisible man struggling? And do not his struggles illuminate what we mean by genuine recognition of our person?

3. Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany*, 143.

4. Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany*, 145.

5. Ofelia Schutte, *Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1.

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- Capital* (Marx), 55
6. Schutte, *Beyond Nihilism*, 36.
7. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2004), 109.
8. Eugene Halton has also traced the movement from *Naurphilosophie* as a bulwark against Western materialism to a vitalist overextension of inner feeling that gave voice to “the sense of inner superiority of German *Kultur* and the German state . . . and which, in its logical irrational endpoint contributed to the successful rise, domination, and self-destruction of German fascism.” Eugene Halton, *Bereft of Reason: On the Decline of Social Thought and Its Prospects for Renewal* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 66. Halton argues for a new kind of identification with an incarnate, living cosmos, of which he sees D. H. Lawrence as a prescient exponent. I shall consider Lawrence in the next chapter.
9. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
10. J. P. Stern, *Nietzsche* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 108–109.
11. See Jean Gayon, “Nietzsche and Darwin,” in *Biology and the Foundation of Ethics*, ed. Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 171. One could of course argue that Darwin’s theory did not imply the utilitarianism and pragmatism against which Nietzsche rebelled. As discussed in the last chapter, Robert Richards and Elizabeth Grosz have attempted to recover a romantic Darwin.
12. See Ofelia Shutte, “Response to Alcock, Ferguson, and Bergoffen,” *Hypatia* 19, no. 3 (2004): 182–202.
13. Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (London: Heinemann, 1973), 47ff. Jay is analyzing Horkheimer’s essays from the *Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung* in 1933 and 1934. The former—a critique of Bergson—was only recently translated, just as I was finishing this manuscript. Max Horkheimer, “On Bergson’s Metaphysics of Time,” *Radical Philosophy* 113 (May–June 2005).
14. Horkheimer, “On Bergson’s Metaphysics of Time,” 12. There are some similarities between Horkheimer’s critique of *Lebensphilosophie* and Voloshinov’s rather crude attack on Freud (1927), in which the work of Driesch and Bergson is bracketed with that of Freud, and they are each accused of betraying a “sui generis fear of history, an ambition to locate a world beyond the social and the historical, a search for this world precisely in the depths of the organic—these are the features that pervade all systems of contemporary philosophy and constitute the symptom of the disintegration and decline of the bourgeois world.” V. N. Voloshinov, *Freudianism: A Critical Sketch*, trans. I. R. Titunik (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 14.
15. I find no mention of the critical relation to vitalism in three excellent works on the Frankfurt School: Rolf Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance*, trans. Michael Robertson (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1994); the anthology *Foundations of the Frankfurt School*, ed. Judith Marcus and Zoltan Tar (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984); and Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of*

Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). I am suggesting that both Adorno's and Horkheimer's critical philosophy is well understood as a critical encounter with the revolt represented by *Lebensphilosophie* as articulated by both Nietzsche and Bergson.

16. Georg Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*, trans. Peter Palmer (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981), 533.

17. Enzo Traverso, *The Origins of Nazi Violence*, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: New Press, 2003), 98. Traverso is commenting on Walter Benjamin's insightful reading of Ernst Junger.

18. First published in 1952 and translated by Peter Palmer and published by Merlin Press, in 1980. I rely here on two excellent critical discussions: H. A. Hodges, "Lukács on Irrationalism," in *Georg Lukács: The Man, His Work and Ideas*, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson (New York: Random House, 1970); and Tom Rockmore, *Irrationalism: Lukács and the Marxist View of Reason* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). The latter's scathing criticism is persuasive. Without the former, I doubt that I could have made sense of this sprawling text.

19. See János Keleman, "In Defense of *The Destruction of Reason*," *Logos* 7, no. 1 (Winter 2008), http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_7.1/kelemen.htm. Keleman does not discuss Lukács' critique of vitalism and racialism.

20. See the chapter by Adorno in *Aesthetics and Politics*, ed. Fredric Jameson (London: NLB, 1977).

21. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1972), 110.

22. Georg Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*, 416.

23. Georg Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*, 414.

24. Todd May, "The Politics of Life in Deleuze's Thought," *Substance: A Review of Theory and Literary Criticism* 20, no. 3 (1991): 24–35. May was, perhaps, the first to argue systematically that life is the structuring principle of Deleuze's thought. But he makes no mention of this argument in his introduction to Deleuze written almost fifteen years later.

25. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 101.

26. One of the most important recent debates about Deleuze has been conducted between Christopher Miller, Eugene Holland, and Ronald Bogue. Christopher Miller, "The Postidentitarian Predicament in the Footnotes of *A Thousand Plateaus*: Nomadology, Anthropology, and Authority," *Diacritics* 23, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 6–35; Eugene Holland, "Representation and Misrepresentation in Postcolonial Literature and Theory," *Research in African Literatures* 34, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 159–173; Christopher Miller, "We Shouldn't Judge Deleuze and Guattari: A Response to Eugene Holland," *Research in African Literatures* 34, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 129–141; Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze's Way: Essays in Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2007).

27. Peter Hallward, *Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation* (London: Verso, 2006).

28. Catherine Gallagher, *The Body Economic: Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University

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Press, 2006), 96–97. The essay on Dickens is reprinted from a 1989 *Zone* article, and one can speculate that Deleuze derived the most powerful image of vitalism from Gallagher’s reading.

29. See Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 9; and Elizabeth Grosz, “Deleuze’s Bergson: Duration, the Virtual, and the Politics of the Future,” in *Deleuze and Feminist Theory*, ed. I. Buchanan and C. Colebrook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 214–235. Grosz’s essay is perhaps the best analysis of what Deleuze means by virtuality.

30. Todd May, *Gilles Deleuze* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 92.

31. Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology*, trans. Norman Madarasz (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2006), 68.

32. Peter Hallward, *Out of This World*, 44–45.

33. Henri Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 22–24.

34. See David E. Cooper, *The Measure of Things* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 92.

35. As Bergson insists: “All that which seems positive to the physicist and to the geometrician is actually a system of negations, the absence rather than the presence of a true reality.” And later: “there are never any things other than those that the understanding has thus constituted.” Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Modern Library, 1911), 228, 271.

36. See John Rajchman, *The Deleuze Connections* (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 2000), 97.

37. See Peter Hallward, *Out of This World*, 19. Robert Wicks shares the same assessment; in fact, he considers Nietzsche’s affirmation of life rather than existence the one source of the violence done for the most part mistakenly in his name. Robert Wicks, *Nietzsche* (One World Publications, 2007).

38. May, “The Politics of Life,” 28. For Deleuze, the primary political problem is the very desire for these forms of life against life. As Deleuze writes: “Why are the people so deeply irrational? Why are they proud of their own enslavement? Why do they fight ‘for’ their bondage as if it were their freedom? Why does a religion that invokes love and joy inspire war, intolerance, malevolence and remorse?” Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: A Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 10. Critical theory is turned inward as we are led to investigations of why we reify social forms or why life subjects itself to death; on the other hand, Marx looked outward at the way in which reality itself deceives us due to the objective illusions generated by social forms, e.g., the objective appearance that value is inherent in the commodity, or that the wage is advanced and pays for the actual labor time performed, or that rent and profit represent the contributions to the total product made by land and capital, respectively. Desire is the pivotal category for Deleuze’s theory of politics; objective illusion—think here of how a straight stick objectively does appear bent in water due not to any subjective failing but to the laws of refraction—is the foundation stone of Marx’s theory of ideology. The movement from an objective science of society to a schizoanalysis of desire was brought about by the manifest inadequacy of Marxist science in

light of the French Communist Party's exteriority to the events of May 1968. In short, vitalism was a response to the failure of Marxism and not the horrified bourgeois response to the rise of scientific socialism as Lukács claimed about Nietzsche and fin de siècle *Lebensphilosophs*.

39. See John Rajchman, *The Deleuze Connections*; see also James Brusseau, *Isolated Experiences: Gilles Deleuze and the Solitudes of Reversed Platonism* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1998). Brusseau discusses Deleuze's ontology of the infinitive verb form. Deleuze himself writes: "Infinitives express becomings or events that transcend mood and tense." Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughlin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 34.

40. Quoted in Nik Fox, *The New Sartre: Explorations in Postmodernism* (New York: Continuum, 2003), 27.

41. On this, see the interesting comments by Christopher Norris, *Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 60–61. Norris argues that Spinoza's critique of Cartesian dualism led, on the one hand, to Louis Althusser's economically determinist theoretical critique of the illusions of the autonomous subject and, on the other hand, to a vitalist politics that refused the subordination of body to metaphysical abstractions (for example, the nation) and socialized exchange (the Oedipus complex). Again, Badiou's tantalizing argument is that this vitalist politics of the body is nothing other than asceticism, upon closer examination.

42. Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, 68.

43. See Alain Badiou, *Metapolitics*, trans. Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2005).

44. See Georg Simmel, *Lebensanschauung* (München: Duncker and Humboldt, 1922). See also Rudolf Weingartner, *Experience and Culture: The Philosophy of Georg Simmel* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1960).

45. Ernst Cassirer, however, argues (unpersuasively) that Simmel yearns to bypass the exteriorizations of Spirit for a mystical relationship of Oneness with God. To him, this is no solution to the tragedy of culture, of which Simmel provided an enduringly important understanding. See Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Cultural Sciences*, trans. S. G. Lofts (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000).

46. For a recent sympathetic reading of Bergsonian mysticism as developed by Muhammed Iqbal, see Souleymane Bachir Diagne, "Islam and Philosophy: Lessons from an Encounter," *Diogenes* 51, no. 2 (2004): 123–128.

47. Hallward, *Out of this World*, 82.

48. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 60

49. Grosz, *Nick of Time* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005), 186.

50. Grosz, *Nick of Time*, 161.

51. Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, trans. Richard Aldington (New York: W. Morrow & Co., 1928).

52. Shown brilliantly by Scott Lash and Celia Lury, *Global Culture Industry: The Mediation of Things* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 13. The vitalist production of difference turns out not to be the watchword of antibourgeois resistance but the advanced logic of capital itself.

116. Nick Nesbitt, *Voicing Memory: History and Subjectivity in French Caribbean Literature* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 83.

117. Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 292.

118. Césaire, *Notebook*, 27–28.

119. Césaire, *Notebook*, 43.

120. Robert Wicks, *Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 105–109. Wicks brilliantly traces much of what goes wrong in Nietzsche's thought due to his preference for life affirmation over complete existential affirmation.

121. Roberto Esposito, *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 134.

122. Irele's introduction in Césaire, *Cabier*, lxvii.

123. Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*, 493.

124. Césaire, *Notebook*, 43–44.

125. Césaire's introduction to Frobenius in *Tropiques* 5 (April 1942), translated and quoted by Arnold, *Modernism and Négritude*, 37–38.

126. See Alain Badiou, *The Century*, trans. Alberto Toscano (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). Badiou finds the meaning of the twentieth century in this passion for the real.

127. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), essay 2, paragraph 24.

96. Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

97. Bhikhu Parekh, *Marx's Theory of Ideology* (Baltimore, Md.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982), 94–95.

98. Butler, *Subjects of Desire*, 21.

99. Nick Nesbitt, *Voicing Memory: History and Subjectivity in French Caribbean Literature* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 120.

100. Peter Hallward, *Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation* (London: Verso Books, 2006), 58.

101. The refusal of the African radical response to submit to the dominant categories of dissent is beautifully explored throughout Brent Hayes Edwards, *The Practice of the Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

102. Gaston Bachelard, *Dialectic of Duration* (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000).

103. Steve Stern, “The Tricks of Time: Colonial Legacies and Historical Sensibilities in Latin America,” in *Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History*, ed. Jeremy Adelman (New York: Routledge, 1999), 148.

104. Robert Bernasconi, “The Assumption of *Négritude*: Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and the Vicious Circle of Racial Politics,” *Parallax* 8, no. 2: 69–83.

105. Stern, “The Tricks of Time,” 148.

106. Quoting Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 85.

107. Nik Fox, *The New Sartre: Explorations in Postmodernism* (New York: Continuum, 2003), 30.

108. Césaire, *Notebook*, 17–18.

109. Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 59.

110. On the imagery of blood, see Irele’s introduction in Césaire, *Cahier*, lxv.

111. Christopher Miller, *The French Atlantic Triangle: Literature and Culture of the Slave Trade* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008), 329. Miller successfully softens this charge against Césaire’s *Négritude*, but he puts the point very well. The criticism is made in Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau, and Raphaël Confiant, “Eloge de Creolite / In Praise of Creoleness” *Callaloo* 13, no. 2 (Autumn 1990): 886–909. The authors announce themselves “to be neither Africans, nor Europeans, nor Asiatics, we proclaim ourselves Creoles.”

112. Quoted in Houlgate, *Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Criticism of Metaphysics*, 8.

113. I have in mind here the analysis of affirmative and negative forces throughout Gilles Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

114. “. . . on the recurrent charge that may have some degree of validity: that of biological essentialism. Confiant and his cohorts have not been the first to object to the notion of the ‘fundamental black’ (*le negre fondamental*), with its implication of an inherited racial substratum that is overlaid by a European cultural veneer.” Davis, *Aimé Césaire*, 181.

115. Butler, *Subjects of Desire*, 215.

53. From the OED’s entry on “Preformationism.” See Hans Driesch, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1908).

54. See Steven Rose, *Lifelines: Biology Beyond Determinism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Rose describes the experiment well: “Wilhelm Roux, killed (with a hot needle) one of the two daughter cells resulting from the first division of frog’s eggs. The result, in accord to mechanist beliefs, was that the surviving cell gave rise to only half the embryo. Embryological development was thus the mechanical unfolding of determinate stages, with irreversible differentiation of function between each cell. By contrast, his pupil Hans Driesch announced in 1891 that if he performed the same experiment with sea-urchin eggs at the two- or four-cell stage, he obtained perfectly sized adults, but each just one-half or one-quarter the normal size. For Driesch this seemed a complete refutation of the mechanist view of life—after all, if a machine is taken apart the individual pieces can never be turned into two or more complete functioning machines of the original type” (107). See also Anne Harrington, *Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). Harrington provides an illuminating discussion of the antimechanist metaphysics that Driesch attempted to develop.

55. Ernst Cassirer, *The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History Since Hegel*, trans. William H. Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), 198.

56. Interesting here is Driesch’s notion of “experimental indeterminism,” in which entelechy only reveals what aspects of the organic life are inexplicable through mechanist methods.

57. Cassirer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, 199.

58. For Driesch, the entelechy was a force internal to each individual organism, while Bergson’s *élan vital* was an external force working on all organisms.

59. Ben Ami Scharfstein, *The Roots of Bergson’s Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943). Scharfstein documents Bergson’s close attention to anti-Darwinian, vitalistic biological research.

60. Georges Canguilhem, *Knowledge of Life*, ed. Paola Marrati and Todd Meyers, trans. Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsburg (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 72.

61. As discussed below, Bergson proved to be a key thinker in the reactionary French Celtic revival movements.

62. See R. C. Grogan, *The Bergsonian Controversy in France* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1988).

63. This was a group to which Bergson and the chronophotographer Marey belonged.

64. See Alex Owen, *The Place of Enchantment: British Occultism and the Culture of the Modern* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). She shows at many points the overlap between Bergson’s critique of the intellect in the face of deeper life forces and various occultist and spiritualist movements.

65. An exception to this would be MacGregor Mathers, who was among the few prominent members from working-class origins.

66. At the same time, occultism did inspire a surge of social experimentation. It was intricately linked with British suffrage movement, animal-rights movements, and religious reform; spiritualism was connected with free love, transcendentalism, and vegetarianism. It is also important to note the global dimensions of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century occult movements. See Gauri Viswanathan, “The Ordinary Business of Occultism,” *Critical Inquiry* 27, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 1–20. As Viswanathan points out, a great deal of the ritual content of nineteenth-century spiritualism was drawn from the writings of disillusioned British colonials detailing their encounters with Indian and East Asian esoteric traditions. Also, spiritualism or *espiritolismo* was also extremely popular in Latin America, particularly in the Spanish Caribbean, where, as in Europe, it was practiced mainly by the Creole middle class and elite. In the Latin American context, however, *espiritolismo* functioned as an esoteric buffer separating hermetic societies of whites from the societies formed around African-derived religions—*santería*, *palo monté*, etc.; these were practiced primarily by the Creole and mestizo working classes and Afro-Cubans. More often than not, the content of *espiritolismo* was explicitly European derived.

3. Bergson and the Racial *Élan Vital*

1. William James, *A Pluralistic Universe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977). I thank Abiola Irele for emphasizing the importance of James’s engagement with Bergson’s thought.

2. Suzanne Guerlac, *Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006).

3. For a wide-ranging review of Bergson’s influence, see R. C. Grogin, *The Bergsonian Controversy in France, 1900–1914* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1988).

4. Judith Shklar, “Bergson and the Politics of Intuition,” *Review of Politics* 20, no. 4 (October 1958): 645.

5. Richard Lehan, “Bergson and the Crisis of the Moderns,” in *The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy*, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

6. For a full description of Bergson’s influence, see Mark Antliff, *Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and the Parisian Avant-Garde* (Princeton, N.Y.: Princeton University Press, 1993), and Mark Antliff, *Avant-Garde Fascism: The Mobilization of Myth, Art, and Culture in France, 1909–1939* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007).

7. John Mullarkey, *Bergson and Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 66.

8. Mullarkey and I are speaking here of the last section of the chapter on “The Meaning of Life” in Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 240–296.

9. Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (New York: Doubleday, 1935), 227.

79. One of the most creative explorations of this dialectic is William Pietz, “Fetishism and Materialism: Limits of Theory in Marx,” in *Fetishism as Cultural Discourse*, ed. Emily Apter and William Pietz (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

80. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). Dipesh Chakrabarty has written eloquently against the narcissistic Western idea that its form of colonialism was so powerful as to have obliterated all other cultures. His critique may seem more persuasive in the case of old writing cultures than oral ones, however.

81. Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 40, no. 46 (November 12, 2005).

82. Quoted in Davis, *Aimé Césaire*, 72–73.

83. Césaire, *Notebook*, 1.

84. Césaire, *Notebook*, 32.

85. Césaire, *Notebook*, 37.

86. Davis, *Aimé Césaire*, 27.

87. Davis, *Aimé Césaire*, 60.

88. Davis, *Aimé Césaire*, 50–51.

89. Brent Edwards, “Aimé Césaire: The Syntax of Influence,” *Research in African Literatures* 36, no. 2 (2005): 7.

90. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skins, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1968), 220.

91. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (New York: Verso, 1993).

92. Drawing on Jacques Lacan, Abdul JanMohamed is one of the few commentators who has focused on the role of work in Hegel’s dialectic and who has underlined that Fanon, too, was critical of Hegel on these grounds. One remaining ambiguity is whether work is intrinsically incapable of educative effect or whether work only under oppressive conditions cannot be positivized. See Abdul JanMohamed, *The Death-Bound Subject: Richard Wright’s Archeology of Death* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005).

93. That Hegel was able to privilege those who labor as vehicles of the Spirit does put him at odds with bourgeois sensibility. Hegel’s thought admits of radical interpretation for both the left and right.

94. McCarney makes this point in his comments on Kojév’s interpretation. Fanon makes the opposite point—that since the freedom of the Antillean black was not struggled for but simply granted, it is not genuine. True recognition must be conquered through life-and-death struggle, but McCarney seems to be correct that the imposition of respect for one’s civil rights does not necessarily win one recognition as a self-consciousness by another self-consciousness. Fanon invidiously praises African Americans vis-à-vis Antillean blacks for their active struggle, but he is mistaken that the struggle resulted in true recognition rather than rights. African Americans were not less racially objectified than blacks on Martinique.

95. Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 207–209.

poetry of the modernist movement, transmitted by T. E. Hulme, of Anglo American poets like T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and William Carlos Williams, should be construed as impelling them away from mimetic representation and toward the immediate presentation or evocation of lived experience through the arresting juxtaposition of verbal images.”

62. T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting has written incisively and definitively of the importance of Suzanne Césaire in the circulation of Frobenius’s ideas among the *Négritude* poets. See “Tropiques and Suzanne Césaire: The Expanse of *Négritude* and Surrealism,” in *Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy*, ed. Robert Bernasconi with Sybol Cook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 115–128.

63. Schutte, *Beyond Nihilism*, 104.

64. One is reminded here of Dilthey. “Art, especially poetry, is closest to life, the truest, most comprehensive and at the same time most concrete representation of its coherence and meaning. Art is the organ for the understanding [*Verstehen*] of life.” Dilthey quoted in Ermarth, *Wilhelm Dilthey*, 134.

65. Gregson Davis, *Aimé Césaire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 73–74.

66. Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze’s Way: Essays in Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishers, 2007), 100.

67. Césaire, *Notebook*, 36.

68. See also Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 60.

69. Suzanne Césaire, “Leo Frobenius and the Problem of Civilisations,” in *Refusal of the Shadow: Surrealism and the Caribbean*, ed. Michael Richardson, trans. Krzysztof Fijalkowski and Michael Richardson (London: Verso, 1996), 82–87.

70. Léopold Sédar Senghor, “The Lessons of Leo Frobenius,” in *Leo Frobenius: An Anthology*, ed. E. Haberland (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1973), xi.

71. Marxists often dismissed *Négritude* as particularist against the universal dialectic of a global proletariat against a cosmopolitan bourgeoisie. However, the PCF was particularist, being a nationalist expression of only one great power, the USSR. Césaire in particular thought the passage to the universal was safer through *Négritude* than through official Marxism.

72. Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason* (London: Merlin, 1980), 492–493.

73. György Márkus, “Life and Soul: The Young Lukács and the Problem of Culture,” in *Lukács Revalued*, ed. Agnes Heller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 12–13.

74. Paulin Hountondji, *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1983), 161–162.

75. Marc Augé, *The Anthropological Circle: Symbol, Function, History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 92.

76. Arnold, *Modernism and Négritude*, 52.

77. Arnold, *Modernism and Négritude*, 50.

78. Arnold, *Modernism and Négritude*, 105.

10. Donald Verene, in Thora Ilin Bayer, *Cassirer’s Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms*, intro. Donald Verene (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001), 36.

11. Bergson anticipates new Darwinist understandings of the power of myth. See John Maynard Smith and Eors Szathmary, *The Origins of Life: From the Birth of Life to the Origin of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

12. Guerlac, *Thinking in Time*, 9.

13. See Rushton Coulborn, “A Civilization in Decline? Lessons for Moderns from the Greeks and Romans,” *Phylon* 2, no. 4 (1941): 377–387.

14. Wilhelm Dilthey makes the point nicely: “It is as if lines have to be drawn in continually flowing stream, figures drawn which hold fast. Between this reality of life and the scientific intellect (*Verstand*) there appears to be no possibility of comprehension, for the concept sunders what is unified in the flow of life. The concept represents something which is universally and eternally valid, independent of the mind which propounds it. But the flow of life is at all times unique [*überall nur einmal*], every wave in it arises and passes.” Quoted in John Ermarth, *Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 137. Dilthey offers a philosophical critique of the very possibility of a science of the lawlike consequences of a specific form of social life; that is, he attacks the very possibility of a social science that sees social consequences, whether beneficial or destructive, as inexorable tendencies of any kind of social organization. The Marxists argued that immiseration and business cycles, culminating in economic breakdown, were tendencies that would work themselves out with iron-clad necessity. Dilthey undercut the very possibility of such a positivist and predictive science of society in the name of life as an unfathomable process of unforeseeable creativity. That is, his critique works at a deeper level than empirical refutation. Ermarth convincingly shows that Dilthey’s life philosophy cannot be equated with an irrationalist assault on scientifically controlled attempts at historical understanding but does not bring out the objective contradiction between Dilthey’s *Lebensphilosophie* and positivist Marxist social science. In short, Dilthey’s life philosophy allowed him to propose a more modest program of a science of historical understanding than offered by the then powerful currents of Marxist thought.

15. Eric Matthews, “Bergson’s Concept of a Person,” in *The New Bergson*, ed. John Mullarkey (New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 122.

16. Sanford Schwarz, *The Matrix of Modernism: Pound, Eliot, and Early Twentieth-Century Thought* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 61. For good reason, Schwarz argues against an exclusive focus on the importance of Bergsonian vitalism for the development of modernism. But the richness and rigor of Bergson’s thought—as well as his influence on the *Négritude* poets—encouraged my singular focus.

17. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, trans. Frank Pogson (New York: Dover, 2001), 231.

18. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as quoted in Ivan Soll, *An Introduction to Hegel’s Metaphysics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 102. But Hegel does not justify these judgments.

19. There is an obvious comparison to be made here between Bergson’s superficial self and Martin Heidegger’s categories of *das Man* and everydayness.

20. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

21. See Joseph Chiari, "Vitalism and Contemporary Thought," in *The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy*, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Joseph Chiari argues for the value of Bergsonian philosophy in demonstrating the kind of truth that aesthetic expression can achieve.

22. The connection is also noted by Martin Jay, *Adorno* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). About the relation between Bergson and Adorno much more needs to be written. Kolakowski seems to point to the connection only to insinuate that Adorno was something of a plagiarist! Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution*, trans. P. S. Falla (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 3:367ff. However, in *Negative Dialectics* Adorno explicitly repudiates Bergson's distrust of language in the achievement of a nonidentical relation to the object as a cult of immediacy. Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 9–10.

23. Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy, and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 714–722.

24. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, x.

25. See Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1978). Adorno does indeed echo the idea: "things, under the law of their pure purposiveness, take on a form which limits intercourse of freedom of conduct or of the thing's independence, which would survive as the core of experience because it would not be consumed by moment of action" (43 [40]). For Bergson, that core of experience can only be appreciated through intuition.

26. Songsuk Susan Hahn, *Contradiction in Motion: Hegel's Organic Conception of Life and Value* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), 40–41.

27. As quoted in Lucio Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: NLB, 1973), 159.

28. René Menil, "Humour: Introduction to 1945," in *Refusal of the Shadow: Surrealism and the Caribbean*, eds. Michael Richardson, Krzysztof Fijakowski, and Philip Lamantia (London: Verso, 1996), 150. Menil is probably unfair to Aristotle, whose prime philosophical examples were after all living and developing organisms and not the billiard balls of early modern physics.

29. See A. D. Lindsay, *The Philosophy of Bergson* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1911).

30. Jacques Chevalier, *Henri Bergson*, trans. Lilian Claeë (London: Rider and House, 1928), 215.

31. Henri Bergson, "An Introduction to Metaphysics," in *The Creative Mind: A Study in Metaphysics*, trans. Mabelle Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 192. As Elizabeth Grosz puts it: "The intellect functions primarily through recognition, through organizing material by what is already known. The intellect thus tends to submit the unknown to the principles of the known, not only to recognize but to precognize, anticipate in advance, what is to come." Elizabeth Grosz,

natural phenomena: plain, river, forest. We have said it: the Ancestor, by living in the ground, is tied to it in the name of the family. And the Earth is a feminine genie; and the mystical marriage of the group and the Earth-Mother is celebrated 'solemnly.'

45. Abiola Irele, *The African Imagination: Literature in Africa and Black Diaspora* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 70–71.

46. Senghor, *Poésie de l'action*, quoted in Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 356.

47. Quoted in Abiola Irele, "Contemporary Thought in French Speaking Africa," in *Africa and the West: The Legacies of Empire*, ed. I. James Mowoe and Richard Bjornson (New York: Greenwood Press), 143.

48. Michael A. Weinstein, *Structure of Human Life: A Vitalist Ontology* (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 93.

49. Arnold, *Modernism and Négritude*, 55.

50. Raymond Williams, *The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists* (New York: Verso Press, 1989), 172. In his study of modernism, Williams unfortunately does not bring the colonial world into his view.

51. Quoted in Ofelia Schutte, *Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 13–14.

52. Schutte, *Beyond Nihilism*, 14.

53. Césaire was read as antirealistic in the Soviet Union. See Janis Pallister, *Aimé Césaire* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1991).

54. Georges Bataille is the vitalist thinker par excellence of such limit experiences. For an important critique of Bataille, see Martin Jay, *Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

55. Aimé Césaire, *Notebook of a Return to the Native Land*, trans. Clayton Eshleman and Annette Smith (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), 8.

56. Césaire, *Notebook*, 9.

57. Michael Dash, *The Other America: Caribbean Literature in a New World Context* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1988), 69.

58. Schutte, *Beyond Nihilism*, 86–87.

59. Stephen Houlgate, *Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Criticism of Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 54–55.

60. Martin Jay perceptively notes that Bergson's epistemological embrace of poetry was later superceded by a critique of verbal images *tout court*. At the very least, Bergson's thought expresses an ambivalence toward the verbal image. See Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, 15. Bergson writes, "The poet is he with whom feelings develop into images, and the images themselves into words which translate them while we in our turn experience the feeling which was, so to speak, their emotional equivalent." After citing this passage, Jay then notes that in *Matter and Memory* Bergson claims that "sympathetic thoughts between two consciousnesses must be prior to the verbal images that communicate them." Jay, *Downcast Eyes*, 202.

61. See Jay, *Downcast Eyes*, 203. Jay shows how central this thesis was to modernism as such: "the widely remarked influence of Bergson on the Imagist

of “subject” peoples who, following the Great War, were gaining greater understanding of the possibilities of their own sovereignty and cultural identities.

27. Irele, *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology*, 74–75.

28. Léopold Sédar Senghor, *On African Socialism*, trans. Mercer Cook (New York: Praeger, 1964), 71.

29. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, *Achieving Our Humanity: The Idea of the Postracial Future* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 124.

30. Eze, *Achieving Our Humanity*, 126

31. Ermarth, however, emphasizes that Dilthey’s attacks on science and empirical study were much less radical than those of many of the *Frühromantiks*. See Michael Ermarth, *Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

32. Quoted in Ermarth, *Wilhelm Dilthey*, 117.

33. Dilthey’s own example is powerful: “There is no man or no thing which would only be an object for me and not a hindrance or a help, a goal for striving or an instance of will, importance, a demand for attention, closeness or opposition, distance or strangeness. The vital relation, whether momentary or lasting, makes men and objects into bearers of happiness, expansion of my existence, extension of my power or that they restrict the horizon of my existence, exert a restriction upon me, and lessen my potentiality.” Quoted in Ermarth, *Wilhelm Dilthey*, 118–119.

34. Eric Matthews, *The Philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (Chesham Bucks: Acumen Publishers, 2002), 59.

35. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, trans. Oliver Davis (New York: Routledge, 2004), 66.

36. Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 198.

37. Tim Ingold, *Evolution and Social Life* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 246–247. Emphasis mine.

38. Léopold Sédar Senghor, *Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism*, trans. Mercer Cook (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1962), 70–74.

39. Milič Čapek, *Bergson and Modern Physics* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971), 88.

40. See Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, trans. F. L. Pogson (1913; repr. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Books, 1990), 231.

41. Senghor, “Ce que l’homme noir apporte,” 24.

42. There is an obvious comparison to be made here between Bergson’s superficial self and Martin Heidegger’s categories of *das Man* and everydayness.

43. François Jacob, *The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity*, trans. B. E. Spillmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 19–20.

44. Senghor, “Ce que l’homme noir apporte,” 30: “In Negro society, man is tied to the collective owned object by the juridical tie of custom and tradition, also and above all by a mystical tie. Let us stop at this last one. The group—family, corporation or age group—has its own personality, which is felt as such by each member. The family is the same blood; it is, as we have seen, the same shared flame; the corporation is only a clan[ic] family, which has ownership of an ‘art.’ Man thus feels like a person—a communal one, I grant—before the object of ownership. But very often the object itself is felt as a person. This is the case of

The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), 192. For Adorno, instrumental rationality determined the nature of pre-cognizing. Todd May attempts to displace precognizing with a Deleuzian epistemology: “difference is the overflowing character of things themselves, their inability to be wrestled into categories of representation.” Todd May, *Gilles Deleuze* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 82. One of the first works to bring out these epistemological aspects of Bergsonism is Karin Stephen, *The Misuse of the Mind: A Study of Bergson’s Attack on Intellectualism* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd, 1922).

32. Max Horkheimer, “On Bergson’s Metaphysics of Time,” *Radical Philosophy* 113 (May–June 2005), 13.

33. Erik Krakauer, *The Disposition of the Subject: Reading Adorno’s Dialectic of Technology* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 77. Krakauer’s defense of Adorno is among the most successful, because as a medical doctor one hears his own struggles to treat patients both in terms of general classifications and in terms of their own individuality, and the ways in which patients are non-identical to the categories into which they are fitted during diagnosis.

34. Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. T. E. Hulme (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955), 69–71.

35. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 39.

36. Bergson provides a complicated, though I believe discredited argument, that even the highest achievements of the intellect, viz., the differential calculus with its basis in homogeneity and divisibility even if to an infinite degree, simply cannot represent true duration.

37. Henri Bergson, “Laughter,” in *Comedy*, ed. George Meredith (Baltimore, Md.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1980), 117–118.

38. Guerlac, *Thinking in Time*, 78–79.

39. I thank Rakesh Bhandari for discussion here.

40. See C. Péguy, “Clio, Dialogue de l’histoire et de l’âme payenne (1909–1912),” in *Euvres en prose* (Paris: La Pléiade, 1968), 1:127–131, 180–181, 286, 299–300; quoted in Michael Lowy, *Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s On the Concept of History*, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2005), 95.

41. Lucio Colletti attempted to the establish the similarity between G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophy of nature, Friedrich Engels’s dialectics of nature, and Bergson’s idealist reaction against science. He argued that Bergsonian metaphysics underwrote the critique of reification as the product of intellect in the founding text of Western Marxism, Georg Lukács’ *History and Class Consciousness*. See Lucio Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*.

42. Bergson stands closer to the tradition of *Naturphilosophie* than to Enlightenment vitalism. Hans Peter Reill has put the contrast this way: “late Enlightenment thinkers argued that humans, being part of living nature, could acquire an intimate understanding of it through self-reflection, and vice versa, by examining living nature, humans could better understand themselves. But in this quest they emphasized the harmony between both, limited strictly the knowledge one could obtain, and usually excluded acquiring knowledge of dead matter through this epistemological procedure. The *Naturphilosophen* obliterated all these reservations.

Human reason and nature's processes were one. Or to put it more succinctly using Schelling's words: "Nature [is] visible mind; mind invisible nature." Hans Peter Reill, *Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 201. For Bergson, the power of intuition justified the epistemological immodesty.

43. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 266.
44. Horkheimer, "On Bergson's Metaphysics of Time," 14.
45. Hilary L. Fink, *Bergson and Russian Modernism, 1900–1930* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999).
46. See Daniel Cohnitz and Marcus Rossberg, *Nelson Goodman* (Chesham: Acumen Publishers, 2006), 13. They argue that Bergson was Goodman's implicit archenemy.
47. Richard Lehan, "Bergson and the Discourse of the Moderns," in *The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy*, eds. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 311.
48. See Michael North's discussion of the function of the African mask in *The Dialect of Modernism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Henry Lewis Gates's discussion of the African mask as the embodiment of "contradiction" in *The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary Criticism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
49. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, 716.
50. Lehan notes that Lawrence had direct knowledge of Bergson's *Creative Evolution*.
51. D. H. Lawrence, *Apocalypse* (London: Martin Secker, 1932), 64.
52. Ernst Bloch, *Principle of Hope*, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1986), 59.
53. Bergson, *The Creative Mind*, 190.
54. Alan Lacey, *Bergson* (London: Routledge, 1989), 144.
55. See Milič Čapek, *Bergson and Modern Physics: A Reinterpretation and Reevaluation* (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishers, 1971). The first half of Čapek's book is the clearest articulation of Bergson's psychological concepts available. It would be unfortunate if many humanists have neglected this text due to its misleading title.
56. Čapek, *Bergson and Modern Physics*, 86–88.
57. Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre, *Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity*, trans. Catherine Porter (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 41.
58. Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, 22–24.
59. György Márkus, "Life and Soul: The Young Lukacs and the Problem of Culture," in *Lukács Revalued*, ed. Agnes Heller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 8.
60. Ernest Cassirer, "'Spirit' and 'Life' in Contemporary Philosophy," in *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp (Evanston, Ill.: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949), 876. After the proofs of this book were completed, I came to read the brilliant discussion of Cassirer's critique of the philosophy of life in Edward Skidelsky, *Ernst Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), 160–194.

8. Michael Kimmelman, "For Blacks in France, Obama's Rise Is Reason to Rejoice, and to Hope," *New York Times* (June 17, 2008), <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/17/arts/17abroad.html>.

9. A. James Arnold, *Modernism and Négritude: The Poetry and Poetics of Aimé Césaire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
10. A. James Arnold, *Modernism and Négritude*, 70.
11. Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Négritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 262–263.
12. Christopher Miller, "Involution and Revolution: African Paris in the 1920s," in *Nationalists and Nomads: Essays on Francophone African Literature and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 9–54.
13. Abiola Irele, *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), 67–88.
14. Miller, "Involution and Revolution," 37.
15. André Pichot, *The Pure Society: From Darwin to Hitler*, trans. David Fernbach (London: Verso Books, 2009), 256, 268.
16. Janet Vaillant, *Black, French, and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 253–254.
17. See Daniel Cohnitz and Marcus Rossberg, *Nelson Goodman* (Chesham: Acumen Publishers, 2006), 13. They argue that Bergson was Goodman's implicit archenemy.
18. See János Riesz, "Senghor and the Germans," *Research in African Literatures* 33, no. 4 (2002): 25–37.
19. Bruce Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 48.
20. Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth*, 48.
21. Vaillant, *Black, French, and African*, 254.
22. D. A. Masolo, *African Philosophy in Search of Identity*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 49.
23. In explaining Deleuze's indebtedness to Bergson here, Ronald Bogue, drawing on Čapek, has given us as sensible an interpretation as one could expect. See Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 16–21.
24. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Press, 1998), 220–221.
25. See here Nurit Bird-David, "Animism Revisited: Personhood, Environment, and Relational Epistemology," *Current Anthropology* 40 (February 1999): S67–S91.
26. Translation mine with assistance from Kea Anderson from "Ce que l'homme noir apporte," *L'Homme de couleur* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1939), 24. This 1939 essay, which appeared in this volume edited by Cardinal Jean Verdier, meant to address the question of race relations in the French colonies. Works such as *L'Homme de couleur* were part of an explosion of writings from both Anglophone and Francophone corners written from various discursive vantage points—ecclesiastic, ethnographic, and political—in an effort to gain a better understanding

134. Robert Bernasconi, "Lévy-Bruhl Among the Phenomenologists: Exoticism and the Logic of the 'Primitive,'" *Social Identities* 11, no. 3 (May 2005): 229–245.

135. In an attempt to underline how radical the break represented by modern science was, Gaston Bachelard would argue, for example, that the primitive mentality predominated among even the first exponents of the scientific revolution.

136. Messay Kebede, "Négritude and Bergsonism," *Journal on African Philosophy* 3 (2003). This piece represents a highly stimulating attempt to develop our understanding of these two intellectual movements beyond the seminal formulations by Abiola Irele, whom I discuss in the next chapter. I am obviously much more critical of Bergson, Bergsonism, and *Négritude* than Kebede, but we share the belief that they need to be understood in their mutual implications.

137. Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, 136–137. Of course, the only remedy for this evolved monstrosity is, as implied on the next page, openness to colonial rule.

138. Aimé Césaire, *Notebook of a Return to the Native Land*, trans. Clayton Eshleman and Annette Smith (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), 35–36.

139. For an important criticism of *Négritude*, see Patrick Taylor, *Narrative of Liberation: Perspectives on Afro-Caribbean Literature, Popular Culture, and Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 171.

4. *Négritude* and the Poetics of Life

1. Michel Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 17.

2. Bruce Lincoln, *Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

3. Aimé Césaire, *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal*, trans. Abiola Irele (Columbus: Ohio State University, 2000), li.

4. Senghor erases here the fundamental difference between a vitalist and existentialist ontology, as my reading of Césaire will show. Léopold Sédar Senghor, "The Spirit of Civilization, or the Laws of African Negro Culture," *Présence Africaine* nos. 8–10 (June–November 1956).

5. Sylvia Washington Bâ, *The Concept of Négritude in the Poetry of Léopold Sédar Senghor* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), 55.

6. Janice Spleth, *Léopold Sédar Senghor* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1985), 42.

7. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Black Orpheus*, trans. S. W. Allen (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1976), 44–47. An important critical treatment of Sartre's influential essay can be found in Belinda Elizabeth Jack, *Négritude and Literary Criticism: The History and Theory of "Negro-African" Literature in French* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 60–79.

61. Nelson Goodman, *Problems and Projects* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1972), 31.

62. For a very helpful overview of the analysis of Bergson's influence on modernist aesthetics from Pound and imagist poetry to cubism, see Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

63. Of course, Marx's critique was that production had to be mediated by money not because the fetishistic powers of money allowed it to monopolize direct exchangeability but because the organization of social labor in the form of commodity production gave rise to the need for money's monopoly. Throughout the interwar years, antimonetary demagoguery, vitalism, and fascism converged. The Nazis were able to invoke this noxious brew while keeping intact the major institutions of commodity productions; once in power, their radicalism against the money men was quickly abandoned and displaced horrifically into the Judeocide. See Moishe Postone, "Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German Reaction to 'Holocaust,'" *New German Critique* 19, no. 1 (1980): 97–115. I thank the much missed Michael Rogin for this reference.

64. Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany, 1831–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 145.

65. Richard Sieburth, "In Pound We Trust: The Economy of Poetry/The Poetry of Economy," *Critical Inquiry* 14, no. 1 (Autumn 1987): 142–172.

66. Sieburth, "In Pound We Trust," 158. Another valuable work on Pound's erratic economic writings is Peter Nicholls, *Ezra Pound: Politics, Economics, and Writing: A Study of the Cantos* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1984).

67. Ezra Pound, *The Cantos of Ezra Pound* (London: Faber & Faber, 1987), 231.

68. Ezra Pound, *The Cantos*, 231.

69. Ezra Pound, *The Cantos*, 230.

70. Sieburth, "In Pound We Trust," 153.

71. The silence of the New Criticism era around Pound's fascist and anti-Semitic past has in recent years been thankfully broken by an increasing debate on the political and social themes in modernism, a debate to which this manuscript hopes to contribute. It is clear that anti-Semitism (as well as a vehement anti-Marxism) functioned as a rhetorical referent for Pound's deep aversion to money and monetarism. The figure of the Jew as the embodiment of abstraction is prevalent throughout Pound's work, and this figuration is usually achieved through the metonymic use of the name of the Jewish banking family Rothschild. In "Canto XLVI," which follows his almost biblical denunciations of the crime of usury, Pound presents a Mr. RothSchild as the agent of underhanded and usurious banking practices. Referred to alternately as "RothSchild" and "Roth-Schild," Pound insists on introducing a "generic" figure of the Jew to stand in as a sign for the sin of abstraction, "hell knows which Roth-Schild 1861, 64 or sometime." The Jew in this context is the embodiment of mobility; he is timeless and enigmatic. In short, as the pun on the German word *Schild* (shield) suggests, he functions as a cover for the workings of a corrupt monetary system. In the narrative of the Canto, "the

Jew” obscures the workings of capitalism with duplicitous language and sleight of hand: “Very few people will / understand this. . . / The general public will probably not / see it’s against their interest.” Like paper money itself, the figure of the Jew stands in the way and obstructs our vision of the working of the economic.

72. An interesting comparison here is to Georges Sorel, who understood Bergson’s vitalism as the metaphysics for a hysterically nationalist and anti-Semitic form of nationalism. Sorel asserted that Bergson’s own Judaic heritage prevented him from understanding the implications of his own vitalist thought (one can also add that this is what prevented the Nazis from a full endorsement of his thought). In other words, Sorel claimed that he understood Bergson better than he understood himself. As will become clear, I think Sorel is quite correct that Bergson did not acknowledge—in fact, in his own political practice worked against—the rising antiliberal and nationalist mythology of his day, to which his philosophy indeed gave a powerful voice. See again the brilliant and painstaking study by Mark Antliff, *Avant-Garde Fascism*.

73. See Wyndham Lewis, *Time and Western Man* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1927).

74. Gertrude Stein, *Three Lives* (1909; repr. New York: Penguin, 1990), 57–168.

75. See Russell Berman, “German Primitivism/Primitive Germany: The Case of Emil Nolde,” in *Fascism, Aesthetics, and Culture*, ed. Richard Goslan, 56–66 (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1992). See also Simon Gikandi, “Race and the Modernist Aesthetic,” in *Writing and Race*, ed. Tim Youngs, 147–165 (London: Longman, 1997).

76. Arthur Lovejoy, *Bergson and Romantic Evolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1914), 17.

77. Stephen, *The Misuse of the Intellect*, 64–65.

78. See Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, 231.

79. One of course remembers here Wyndham Lewis’s horrified response in 1927 to the penetrating and merging of duration with its “emotional urgency and visceral agitation” and preference for “the distinct, the geometric, the universal, non-qualified” and things standing apart—“the wind blowing between them and the air circulating freely in and out of them.” Wyndham Lewis, *Time and Western Man*, 428. The criticism that I shall be developing is radically different.

80. Lovejoy’s early encounter would seem to have been a key point in the career of his ideas. He had already noted Bergson’s similarity to the romanticism and *Naturphilosophie* of Schelling, the analysis of whose thought is the dénouement of Lovejoy’s study of the concept of plentitude and the great chain of being. Lovejoy would return to Bergson at the very end of his career as well.

81. Arthur Lovejoy, “Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism,” *International Journal of Ethics* (1913).

82. Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Bergson and Creative Evolution/Involution,” in *The New Bergson*, ed. John Mullarkey (New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 149–150. Pearson is quoting from Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 4–5.

83. May, *Gilles Deleuze*, 43.

this interpretation of Bergson that Lovejoy attacked as conservative in “Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism,” *International Journal of Ethics* 23, no. 4 (July 1913): 419–443. But Bergson himself and more importantly Bergsonism are better understood as radical traditionalism.

116. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 192. Gilroy also suggests that Wright’s antitraditionalism leaves him few resources against the embrace of technocratic modes of governance and echoes the earlier embrace of Western modernism by those benighted Africans who had made peace with imperialism. Gilroy’s thinking, it should be remembered, has its own tradition—the dialectical analysis of the Enlightenment.

117. Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic*, 198–199.

118. Stephen Asma, “Metaphors of Race: Theoretical Presuppositions Behind Racism,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (January 1995): 13–29.

119. Asma, “Metaphors of Race,” 22–23.

120. Lovejoy, *Bergson and Romantic Evolution*, 53–54.

121. George Bernard Shaw, *Back to Methuselah: A Metaphysical Pentateuch* (London: Constable, 1931).

122. May, *Gilles Deleuze*, 37.

123. See David Cooper, *World Philosophies: A Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); David Cooper, *The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility, and Mystery* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); David Cooper, “*Verstehen*, Holism, and Fascism,” in *Verstehen and Humane Understanding*, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and David Cooper, “Modern Mythology: The Case of ‘Reactionary Modernism,’” *History of the Human Sciences* 9, no. 2 (1996): 25–37.

124. Enrico Cavacchioli, “Let the Moon Be Damned,” in *Poeti Futuristi* (Milan: Nuova Accademia, 1963).

125. Ernst Junger, *Sämtliche Werke: Essays II, Der Arbeiter* (Stuttgart: Klett-CottaVerlagsgemeinschaft, 1981), 160.

126. Oswald Spengler, *Man and Technics: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Life*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Knopf, 1932), 85–86. See Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

127. Robert Wicks, *Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002), 41–43.

128. See the discussion in Emmanuel Eze, *Achieving Our Humanity: The Idea of a Postracial Future* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

129. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1965).

130. Cooper, “Modern Mythology,” 302.

131. For a useful collection of Dilthey’s writings, see Wilhelm Dilthey, *Pattern and Meaning in History: Thoughts on History and Society* (New York: Harper, 1962).

132. Cooper, “Modern Mythology,” 295.

133. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*, trans. L. A. Clare (New York: MacMillan, 1978).

is determined to make of his life an integrated whole, is able to understand and properly respond to the Situation he is in by bringing to bear upon it the lessons of tradition. A heritage of course is not mine alone, though how I take it over is my doing. The ‘fateful destiny’ to be gleaned from a heritage is that of a ‘community, a people . . . [a] generation.’ To live as an authentically historical person, then, is not to ‘soar above’ or ‘float free’ from my fellows but to ‘exist essentially in Being-With-Others’ who have also inherited such a destiny. Hence the dichotomy which Heidegger’s choice between authentic and inauthentic existence seemed to imply—solipsistic alienation from society versus sheepish refuge in the They—turns out to be a false one. By taking over the heritage handed down to me, I at once ‘snatch’ myself from the comfortable embrace of the They and find a new ‘home’ in a people or generation which shares that inheritance. Heidegger’s authentic person, though ‘individualized,’ is not the existentialist ‘loner,’ necessarily at odds with his society, who stalks the novels of Albert Camus. On the contrary, his ‘resoluteness,’ if it is to have any issue and direction, requires identification with ‘a people’s destiny,’ and only then can Angst be transformed from a state of ‘uncanniness’ into one of ‘unshakeable,’ if ‘sober,’ joy at recovery from ‘lostness in the They.’” David E. Cooper, *Heidegger* (London: Claridge Press, 1996), 48–50. Cooper argues that this jargon of authenticity does not contain *in nuce* Heidegger’s later commitment to the Nazi political project. Be that it as it may, it ties authentic existence to the recovery of what can only be the founding myths by which a people are imagined to be united and therefore implies a mythical and conservative response to the crises of modernity.

114. In a footnote to *Being and Time*, Heidegger dismisses Bergson’s conception of time but does not seem to have understood it and thus the proximity of Bergson’s vision to his. The fact remains that both thinkers contrasted the subjective experience of time to its objective conception in the physical sciences. While Rüdiger Safranski emphasizes Heidegger’s debt to the Bergsonian critiques of rigidified forms, abstract temporality, and abstract subjectivity—and Safranski, overly apologetic of Heidegger, misses their most important similarity as a revolutionary traditionalists—there exists no detailed comparative study of quite probably the two most important continental philosophers of the twentieth century. But see Critchley’s short note on their similar temporal conceptions in his essay “On Derrida’s *Spectres of Marx*,” reprinted in Simon Critchley, *Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity* (London: Verso Books, 1999), 155. Rüdiger Safranski, *Heidegger: Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Ewald Osers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). One also wonders how to explain the much greater interest in Heidegger than in Bergson in the American academy. One hopes that with the scientism of American philosophy Bergson’s mistakes about vitalism and Einstein’s theory of relativity have not been seen as more embarrassing than Heidegger’s political commitments. For my purposes, there is no doubt that Bergson’s influence was many times more important than Heidegger’s for aesthetic modernism. Of course, their shared importance for me was their success in making compelling cultural reaction.

115. Bergson lauded the interpretation of his work by Eduard LeRoy (*Une philosophie nouvelle: Henri Bergson*, 1912), a traditional traditionalist, and it was

84. Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Hubberjam (1966; repr. New York: Zone Books, 1988), 26.

85. How does Bergson’s duration compare to William James’s stream of consciousness, as analyzed by Franco Moretti in *The Modern Epic: The World System from Goethe to Garcia Marquez*? I am trying to emphasize here how interpenetrated the moments are, or, in other words, how misleading Bergson thought it was to think of time as any kind of succession or form of space. The past thus has a much greater role; it is indestructible, though not always present even in its effects. If, as Jameson suggests, the Bergsonian duration is a modernist trope in an age of incomplete modernization, then the analysis of the stream of consciousness has more contemporary relevance, especially in a world of loosely related advertising images meant to whet appetites for commodities.

86. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 7–8.

87. “We believe that so far as time is taken to be a pure continuity, devoid of any discreteness, the variety of temporal manifestations is left unintelligible. Any novelty implies discreteness of appearances, since if they were blended with the previous phases of time, they could not present a real novelty, being already tied to the past. If nothing distinctly different occurs, nothing can occur at all. For a temporal transition is a passage to something, which has not yet been possessed in the past or the present. Otherwise, as a strife for obtaining that which is already obtained the situation would simply be nonsensical and impossible.” Andrew P. Uchenko, *Logic of the Event: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929), 119–120.

88. See Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

89. Since Bergson’s thought can only be vague given that its propositional content is about the ineffable, the meaning of his thought can be productively sought in its aesthetic and political uses. Such studies (Antliff’s being the most important one) reveal that Bergson’s thought has had many, even contradictory, meanings, almost all of them disturbing. Of course, it is possible that Bergson was misread in his own time and that posthumous readings such as Gilles Deleuze’s, Milič Čapek’s, Guerlac’s, and Elisabeth Grosz’s have taught us to read Bergson anew. But there does not seem to be at this point a self-conscious effort to read Bergson against himself and Bergsonism, even though many scholars do read Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger in this critical way. See Mark Antliff, “The Fourth Dimension and Futurism: A Politicized Space,” *The Art Bulletin* 82, no. 4 (December 2000): 720–733; and Mark Antliff, “The Jew as Anti-Artist: George Sorel, Anti-Semitism, and the Aesthetics of Class Consciousness,” *Oxford Art Journal* 20, no. 1 (1997): 50–67.

90. Guerlac, *Thinking in Time*, 83.

91. J. W. Burrow, *The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848–1914* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 168.

92. Guerlac, *Thinking in Time*, 104.

93. Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life* (London: Routledge, 2002), 71.

94. Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual*, 377. For Lukács, Nietzsche's controversial doctrine of eternal recurrence was meant as a critique of the possibility of radical innovation. I find this interpretation doubtful.

95. Löwy, *Fire Alarm*, 12. Löwy is quoting from Benjamin's *Arcades Project*.

96. Grosz, *Nick of Time*, 170.

97. Guerlac, *Thinking in Time*, 149.

98. On the coherence of the multiple selves, see Graham Parkes, "A Cast of Many: Nietzsche and Depth Psychological Pluralism," *Man and World* 22 (1989): 453–470. Guerlac presents Bergson as an alternative to Hegel, but Nietzsche is an alternative to both.

99. Jonathan Crary, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2001), 327. Crary's reading of Bergson is one of the most perceptive. I am more skeptical of whether Bergsonian metaphysics in fact underwrites freedom in a meaningful sense and allows for irreducible novelty.

100. A fine introduction to Deleuze's theory of identity can be found in John Rachjaman's chapter on "Life" in *The Deleuze Connections* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000), 79–112. It seems to me that Peter Hallward has shown that Deleuze is a utopian more than a mystic.

101. Leonard Lawlor, *The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics* (New York: Continuum, 2003), 67–69.

102. Grosz, *Nick of Time*, 196. At other points, Grosz critiques the emphasis on heritage and tradition and embraces the importance of Nietzsche's emphasis on forgetting as a precondition for creative action. In other words, Grosz does not explore the differences between Nietzsche and Bergson, who are both subsumed under the category of philosophers whose reflections on the productivity of time were themselves untimely.

103. May, *Gilles Deleuze*, 50.

104. Frederic Jameson, *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present* (London: Verso, 2002), 142. I cannot but wonder here whether a Bergsonian conception of duration structures the temporal sense of so-called third-world migrant workers who are periodically returning to their villages after working in modern agriculture and cities. One awaits a study of the simultaneity that Jameson finds in Proust and Joyce in contemporary migrant literature. Here the spatial crossing of the border may indicate a temporal fusion of two worlds, the past and present.

105. See George F. Putnam, "The Meaning of Barrèsisme," *Western Political Quarterly* 7, no. 2 (June 1954): 161–182. Putnam does not see the homology between Barrès' theory of freedom and Bergson's theory of duration.

106. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 219.

107. Mark Antliff, *Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and the Parisian Avant-Garde* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 178–179. Antliff is drawing here from Eugen Weber's *Peasants Into Frenchmen*. However, outside of Weber's vision was the importation and use of Algerian peasants; they did not become Frenchmen—except, of course, as conscripts.

108. See Jonathan Lear, *Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 141–155. Lear provides an insightful and important Freudian reading of Freud's own mythmaking about racial memory in *Moses and Monotheism*.

109. A. James Arnold, *Modernism and Négritude: The Poetry and Poetics of Aimé Césaire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 161.

110. Grosz, *Nick of Time*, 178.

111. See Thomas Trautmann, *Aryans and British India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Trautmann provides a most brilliant study of this assimilation and its tremendously destructive consequences; his work builds on the pioneering work of George Stocking.

112. Simon Critchley, *Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 68–72. See also Simon Critchley, *Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and Contemporary French Thought* (London: Verso, 1999), 129–130.

113. David E. Cooper offers a similar interpretation of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, especially section 74 of division 2, in which one finds references not to individual Dasein as such but to one's generation, time, and *volk*: "birth refers to our Being-towards-the beginning. This 'beginning' is what he calls 'heritage,' that which has been 'handed down' to us as historically located creatures. This heritage is not to be equated with the conditions into which we are 'thrown,' for these constitute our world as structured and articulated by the They, and the They inevitably ignores, distorts or trivializes our heritage. Either the They dismisses the past as old hat and 'seeks the modern,' makes it 'unrecognizable,' or reduces it to a repository of quaint traditions only to be disinterred on special occasions, like the trooping of the colour. Far from our heritage dictating the shape of everyday, inauthentic existence, it is precisely 'in terms of the heritage . . . that resoluteness . . . takes over' that the possibilities of authentic existence are 'disclosed.' . . . In properly taking over our heritage, we 'snatch' ourselves back from the 'comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly' of the They. This time, moreover we are left without guidance as to the possibilities on which to resolve, for the 'authentically historical' person who 'takes over' his heritage will draw these possibilities precisely from that heritage. For what the heritage offers are 'the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there,' the decisions and ways of life adopted by our forebears which are open to us to 'repeat,' for example by 'choosing a hero' from the past, and—with due appreciation of the new context—emulate. Indeed, 'revering the repeatable possibilities of existence' is to revere 'the sole authority' which people can pit against the dictatorship of the They and, in so doing, become free. . . . Only in the light of a heritage, Heidegger argues, are our horizons widened so that we can enjoy a 'clear vision' of the Situation in which we are placed and hence authentically respond to it. Dasein, recall, is essentially temporal in nature. In everyday, 'average' life, it is presently absorbed 'alongside' things in a world it is already 'thrown' into 'for the sake of' realizing its projects in the future. But we are now in a position to define an authentic mode of temporality or historicity: Dasein's being 'in the moment of vision for "its time,"' a vision of its Situation which requires both recall of its heritage and anticipation of its death. . . . The authentic person then is one who